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NOTES
Although Louisiana has no express regulation of lie detectors, the
newly adopted Constitution may provide a remedy to employees and
others injured by private lie detector use. A constitutional right
against "invasions of privacy" is now explicitly mandated by Section
V of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution and at least one
commentator has suggested that this protection is applicable to pri-
vate action.5
Absent a state statute strictly prohibiting employer use of lie
detectors, the practical remedies afforded by the law to an individual
employee are few. No federal law exists on point and only fourteen
states have protective laws, many of which exempt from coverage
vast sections of the working force. While unions may effectively bar
the use of the device through collective bargaining agreements, a
great number of American workers are not affiliated with labor
unions. Thus, the legal setting is ripe for legislative action which
would reconcile the rights of employer and employee with respect to
the lie detector. The proposal rejected by the 1974 legislature would
have so reconciled this conflict in favor of the privacy of the individ-
ual worker; it is hoped that a similar proposal will be enacted soon.
James P. Lambert
SEX DISCRIMINATION: AD Hoc REVIEW IN THE HIGHEST COURT
Since its landmark decision in Reed v. Reed' in 1971, the United
States Supreme Court has been reluctant to explain the extent to
which the equal protection clause dictates the design of legislation
employing sex-based classifications. In three recent cases,2 the Court
has continued its seemingly ad hoc approach to sex discrimination
claims, insuring further inconsistencies in lower court review of such
claims. Although the challenged statutes were upheld in each in-
our recognition of the results as admissible evidence." See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-
2225 (1967).
51. See Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1974).
1. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Until Reed, the Court gave sex discrimination claims only
passing review. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (statute exempting women from
jury duty upheld); Geosaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (denial of bartending license
to women upheld); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upheld maximum hour law
for women); Minor v. Happersatt, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (statute denying
women the vote upheld); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (statute
denying women admission to the bar upheld).
2. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 95 S. Ct. 572 (1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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stance, the changing composition of the Court's majority indicates
that certain of its members are not yet committed to a particular
stance.3
Developments in the law of sex discrimination cannot be isolated
from developments in the area of equal protection generally. Applica-
tion of the Court's new strict scrutiny analysis hinges upon finding a
suspect classification or a fundamental right. Otherwise, the tradi-
tional minimum scrutiny standard is appropriate.' The cases indicate
that suspect classes are "discrete and insular minorities"5 incapable
of wielding legislative influence and "subjected to . . . a history of
purposeful unequal treatment."' Such classes possess highly visible,
distinctive characteristics readily conducive to stigmatization.7 Addi-
tionally, the defining traits of a suspect classification are essentially
congenital, immutable, and beyond the individual's control.8 Fe-
males possess all of the foregoing indicia of suspectness, excepting
ostensibly the "discrete and insular minority" requirement. However,
the marked disparity between the sexes in accessibility to available
3. In Kahn, Brennan, White and Marshall dissented. In Geduldig and Schles-
inger, Brennan, Marshall and Douglas dissented.
4. Early equal protection challenges to legislation were decided under the "mini-
mum rationality" test which required only that the statutory classification be reason-
able, not arbitrary (Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Lindsley
v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911)), and have a rational relation-
ship to the legislature's objective. See Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308 (1966);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). A statute was upheld if any set of
facts could be conceived to justify it. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
The precarious protection afforded individual rights under this test spurred the Warren
Court's development of the "strict scrutiny" test applicable to statutes involving clas-
sifications considered suspect or interests deemed fundamental. Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969). Under this test a statute must serve a "compelling state interest"
(Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-
94 (1964)) that could not be achieved by more precisely tailored legislation. Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972). In the absence of suspect classifications or
fundamental interests, the mere rationality standard remained applicable. See McGo-
wan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961): For a more detailed description of the two-tiered
model, see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Developments].
5. In a famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938), Justice Stone stated: "[Pirejudice against discrete and insular minori-
ties may . . . call for a . . . more searching judicial inquiry."
6. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1972).
7. Developments 1127 n.5; Note, 26 STAN. L. Rsv. 155, 162 (1973).
8. Developments 1126-27; Note, 26 STAN. L. REV. 155, 163 (1973). In San Antonio
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19 (1972), Justice Powell also suggested that in
order to be labeled suspect, a disadvantaged class must be objectively identifiable. In
his dissent, Justice Marshall disagreed with this requirement. Id. at 93.
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channels of political influence reduces the female's real political
power to that of a discrete minority.
Nevertheless, the Court has refused to designate sex as suspect,
and its apparent belief that minimal scrutiny is also inappropriate
has rendered the two-tiered model particularly unsuited for deciding
cases involving alleged sex discrimination. In response to the model's
failure to adequately cover cases involving near-suspect classifica-
tions such as sex, the Court began to "acknowledge substantial equal
protection claims on minimum rationality grounds"' in such cases by
requiring that the means used "in fact" work a substantial further-
ance of the legislature's objective.'" However, as a consequence of the
Court's use of traditional equal protection language in reaching re-
sults not in accord with a minimum rationality approach, some lower
courts felt compelled to construct a new "intermediate model" by
infusing new meaning into the traditional phraseology."
In Reed v. Reed," the Court invalidated a statute giving a man-
datory preference to males over females when both were equally qual-
ified as administrators of a decedent's estate. Although the Court
recognized that "the objective of reducing the workload on probate
courts by eliminating one class of contests is not without some legiti-
macy,"' 3 it non.etheless concluded:
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over
members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of a
hearing on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legis-
lative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
9. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for the Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 19 (1972).
10. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-55 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
76 (1971). See also James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715, 723-30 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-76
(1972). Under this method of review, the reasonableness of the legislature's means is
determined empirically by evidence offered to the Court, and not by "perfunctory
judicial hypothesizing." Gunther, supra note 9, at 21. The result is a degree of judicial
scrutiny situated between the strict scrutiny and mere rationality tests.
11. E.g., Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 230-31 (4th Cir. 1973); Green v. Water-
ford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973). But see, e.g., Schattman v. Texas
Employment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32, 40 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107
(1973); Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 367 F. Supp. 981, 988
(D.N.J. 1973).
12. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).




To invalidate the legislation under the traditional test was clearly
incongruous with the Court's ascription of "some legitimacy" to the
statute; thus, the Court must have in fact applied more than minimal
scrutiny. Because of the apparent inconsistency, some lower courts
concluded that Reed mandated the use of the "intermediate model"
in sex discrimination cases, 5 while others failed to discern a depar-
ture from the traditional standard. I6
Two years later, the Court attempted to clarify Reed in Frontiero
v. Richardson. In Frontiero, a female Air Force officer challenged a
federal statute requiring a female member of the armed services to
demonstrate that her spouse was dependent upon her for one-half of
his support in order to obtain increased benefits available to male
members without a similar showing. In a plurality opinion announc-
ing an eight-to-one judgment invalidating the statute, four Justices
declared sex a suspect classification, finding "at least implicit sup-
port for such an approach"'" in Reed. While also basing their decision
on Reed, the other Justices supporting the result considered it unnec-
essary to label sex as suspect."
The discordance of opinion in Frontiero caused a further splin-
tering of lower court opinion on sex discrimination. A number of lower
courts interpreted Frontiero as requiring strict scrutiny of sex-based
classifications." Some courts continued to employ the intermediate
15. Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973); Green v. Waterford Bd. of
Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973); Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp.
501 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
16. Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 982 (1974); Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973); Bucha v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 351 F.
Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill. 1972). A third view of Reed v. Reed was taken by a federal district
court which declared that "sex legislation is automatically suspect." Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Services, 357 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Even before Reed,
however, one federal and one state court had taken the position that sex is inherently
suspect. U.S. ex rel Robinson v. New York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); Sail'er
Inn Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
17. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
18. Id. at 682.
19. Justice Powell, joined by Justices Burger and Blackmum, stated that Reed
"did not add sex to the narrowly limited group of classifications which are inherently
suspect." Id. at 692 (concurring opinion). Justice Stewart concurred on the grounds
that the statute "works an invidious discrimination." Id. at 691. Due to the consider-
able administrative convenience that the questioned statute affords the government,
it is evident that this statute, as in Reed, did possess "some legitimacy." Hence,
"despite their silence on the matter, Justices Stewart and Powell used stricter scrutiny
than the traditional standard warranted." Comment, 5 LOYOLA U.L.J. (Chi.) 285, 295
(1974).
20. Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 499 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1974); Fortin v.
Darlington Little League, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 473 (D.R.I. 1974); Johnston v. Hodges,
[Vol. 35
NOTES
test of Reed," while others found a choice between the Reed and
Frontiero standards unnecessary due to the failure of the particular
statute under review to satisfy either standard." Lastly, despite Reed
and Frontiero, a number of lower courts continued to adhere to the
traditional test.2 3
In upholding a for-widows-only property tax exemption in Kahn
v. Shevin,24 the Court again refused to denominate sex as suspect.
Requiring that-the Florida statute bear only a "fair and substantial
relation" 5 to its purpose, the Court found a rational basis for the
statute in its reduction of the economic disparity between the sexes. 21
Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas cited as supportive of the
result the traditionally "large leeway" allowed states in designing
their taxation systems.?
Employing a strict scrutiny approach in his dissent, Justice
Brer1nan agreed that the statute served a compelling governmental
interest28 of "ameliorating the effects of past economic discrimination
against women. '2 Nonetheless, he felt the statute should fall due to
the state's failure to prove that this compelling interest "could not
be achieved by a more precisely tailored statute, 30 since the inclu-
372 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Ky. 1974); Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School Dist.,
371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 1973); Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Wel-
fare, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973); Stem v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co.,
365 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Ballard v. Laird, 360 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. Cal. 1973);
People v. Ellis, 57 Ill. 2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974); State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350
N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fain. Ct. 1973); Bassett v. Bassett, 521 P.2d 434 (Okla. App. 1974);
Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 517 P.2d 599 (1974). See also Junior Chamber of
Commerce v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974); Held v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 373 F. Supp. 996 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
21. Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 1233
(D. Kan. 1974); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 374 F. Supp. 1056 (D. Ore.
1974).
22. Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1973); Bowen v. Hackett, 361
F. Supp. 854 (D.R.I. 1973).
23. White v. Fleming, 374 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Ritacco v. Norwin
School Dist., 361 F. Supp. 930 (W.D. Penn. 1973); Warshafsky v. Journal Co., 63 Wis.
2d 130, 216 N.W.2d 197 (1974).
24. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
25. "Florida's differing treatment of widows and widowers 'rest[s] upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion.' Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76, quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412, 415." Id. at 355.
26. Id.
27. Id. The repeated citing of statistics by the court in Kahn provides some evi-
dence that the Court was using the methodology of intermediate scrutiny.
28 Id. at 359.




sion of wealthy widows in the exempted class resulted in statutory
overinclusiveness to a degree violative of equal protection. In a sepa-
rate dissent, Justice White found the statute not only overinclusive,
but also underinclusive in denying the exemption to women who are
not widows. White further suggested that if the statutory purpose
were viewed as simply the amelioration of past discrimination in
general, the classification would be underinclusive for ignoring "all
those widowers who have felt the effects of economic discrimina-
tion.""'
Just two months after Kahn, the Court in Geduldig v. Aiello"
upheld a provision of the California disability insurance program
which precluded payment of benefits to female employees for disabil-
ities accompanying normal pregnancy. In his majority opinion, Jus-
tice Stewart pointed to the'exclusion of normal pregnancy as promot-
ing the legitimate state interests in "maintaining the self-supporting
nature of its insurance program . . . distributing the available re-
sources in such a way as to keep benefit payments at an adequate
level . . . [and] maintaining the contribution rate at a level that will
not unduly burden the participating employees."33 Stewart further
declared that the equal protection clause permits a state to attack
certain problems "one step at a time," 4 and so long as a social welfare
program is "rationally supportable," 5 the Court will uphold it.
In another dissent on strict scrutiny grounds, Justice Brennan
viewed the Court's decision as threatening a return to "traditional"
equal protection analysis in the review of sex discrimination claims.
He noted that although the statute excludes a "gender-linked disabil-
ity peculiar to women,"37 men are entitled to full compensation for
all disabilities suffered, including those that solely or primarily affect
their sex."
In the more recent case of Schlesinger v. Ballard,39 the Court
approved a statute guaranteeing female, but not male naval officers
thirteen years of commissioned service before a mandatory discharge
for want of promotion. In concluding that the disparity of "opportuni-
31. Id. at 362 (White, J., dissenting).
32. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
33. Id. at 496.
34. Id. at 495, quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 503.
37. Id. at 501.
38. Id.
39..95 S. Ct. 572 (1975).
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ties for professional service"4 0 supplied a "complete[ly]" 4' rational
basis for the statute, the Court once more failed to specifically iden-
tify the test being used. Again writing for the majority, Justice Stew-
art emphasized that "the primary business of armies is to fight" and
that "the responsibility for determining how best our armed forces
shall attend to that business rests with Congress and with the Presi-
dent."42
Relying on the legislative history and structure of the statute in
his dissent, Justice Brennan concluded that the intent of Congress
was not to compensate women for the inequities attending Naval
career advancement programs."3 Finding no other legitimate legisla-
tive purpose" for the challenged classification, Brennan claimed that
the Court had gone "far to conjure up a legislative purpose which may
have underlain"4 the statute. He further contended that after
Frontiero it could no longer be argued that the Court must bow to
Congress when equal protection claims concern military-related stat-
utes.4"
The Court's continued use of old equal protection language while
applying both minimal and intermediate levels of scrutiny makes
possible two differing interpretations of the Kahn-Geduldig-
Schlesinger trilogy. Since all three cases utilize traditional language
and achieve a traditional result, they may be viewed as reversing the
active review posture assumed in Reed. Conversely, it may be argued
that the Court was using intermediate scrutiny in each case and that
the three statutes involved simply passed the test due to the Court's
usual deference to legislative and executive judgments in the areas
of taxation,47 social welfare,4" and military administration." Thus, by
failing to explicitly identify the test used, these decisions will likely
40. Id. at 577.
41. Id. at 578.
42. Id. Although the result of this case comports with traditional analysis, the
Court's use of such terms as "complete rationality" (id.), and its reliance on the
"demonstrable fact that male and female line officers ... are not similarly situated"
(id. at 577), indicates an intermediate approach.
43. Id. at 579.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 583.
47. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1972); Allied
Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1958); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435
(1940); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
48. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
49. In Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) the Court stated: "Orderly
government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate
Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters."
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perpetuate, if not increase, the divergence in lower court treatment
of sex-based classifications.
Even though the Court fails to clearly indicate its present posi-
tion on sex discrimination, one message of these recent cases is un-
mistakeable-sex, at least for the present, is not suspect. Perhaps a
majority of the Court wishes to decide sex discrimination cases on an
ad hoc basis, withholding a final resolution of the issue of suspectness
until the country reaches its decision on the Equal Rights Amend-
ment." Justice Powell expressed this view in his concurrence in
Frontiero:
It seems to me that the reaching out to preempt by judicial action
a major political decision which is currently in the process of
resolution does not reflect appropriate respect for the duly pre-
scribed legislative processes.5
For the present, a more precise articulation of the components
of the intermediate model, if indeed the Court is employing one, is
needed to provide more definite guidelines for the lower courts. A
definitive explication of the applicability of the test to sex-based
classifications would significantly subdue the confusion stemming
from the Kahn, Geduldig, and Schlesinger decisions.
Victor Lynn Marcello
EMPLOYMENT AT WILL-LIMITATIONS ON EMPLOYERS'
FREEDOM TO TERMINATE
A married female employee sued her employer for damages for
breach of an oral contract of employment which was terminable "at
will" by either party. Hostility on the part of the plaintiff's foreman
resulting from her refusal to go out with him was alleged by plaintiff
to be the cause of her dismissal. Affirming the trial court, the New
Hampshire supreme court held the employer liable for damages, rea-
soning that a termination by the employer of an at will employment
contract "which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on
50. The ERA provides: "Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Section 2.
The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article. Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification." S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. Rxc. 9598 (1972); H.R.J. Res.
208, 92d Cong., ist Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 35815 (1971). The states have until March
22, 1979, to ratify the amendment.
51. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
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